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ABSTRACT  
 
Networks form a key part of the infrastructure of contemporary governance  
arrangements and, as such, are likely to continue for some time. Networks can take  
many forms and be formed for many reasons. Some networks have been explicitly  
designed to generate a collective response to an issue; some arise from a top down  
perspective through mandate or coercion; while others rely more heavily on  
interpersonal relations and doing the right thing. In this paper, these three different  
perspectives are referred to as the “3I”s: Instrumental, Institutional or Interpersonal.  
 
It is proposed that these underlying motivations will affect the process dynamics  
within the different types of networks in different ways and therefore influence the  
type of outcomes achieved. This proposition is tested through a number of case  
studies. An understanding of these differences will lead to more effective design,  
management and clearer expectations of what can be achieved through networks.  
 
Introduction:  
 
Networks in their various forms are a cornerstone of the policy development and  
service delivery infrastructure for many countries and are likely to remain so for the  
duration (Agranoff, 2003; Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, 2003; Huxham, 2000; Klijn &  
Koppenjan, 2000; Mandell, 1994, 2001a). Networks are a governance mechanism to  
link and order the efforts of dispersed actors and organisations (Brown & Keast, 2003;  
Cordero- Guzman, 2001). Through their collective efforts networks enable  
participating agencies to overcome issues of scale and scope, tap into partners’  
opportunities and develop innovative solutions to complex and intractable problems.  
Not surprisingly, given the variations in purpose a wide array of network  
configurations has eventuated (Agranoff, 2003; Brown & Keast, 2003; Keast et al.,  
2007; Mandell & Steelman, 2003; O’Leary & Bingham, 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
For all networks there may be different underlying motivations that govern the  
behaviour of participants in networks. Some participate because of interpersonal  
reasons such as ‘doing the right thing’ and commitment to the group. Others are more  
instrumental or pragmatic in their uptake and use networks viewing them as a means  
to an end. That is, as an effective, cost reducing alternative approach to achieve goals.  
Other networks are more institutionally driven, in which the behaviour of members is  
influenced and shaped by a dominant framework developed and supervised by the  
initiating agency or organisation. Following Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997)  
these three different perspectives of what motivate the formation of networks and  
inform how they will operate have been called interactive or interpersonal,  
instrumental and institutional. In this paper we refer to these perspectives as the 3Is.  
Categorising the motivation for network endeavour into the 3Is is argued to facilitate  
a better understanding of the motivations that drive networks and establish a coherent  
framework in which to direct requisite effort and attention to networks.  
 
A substantial body of evidence and understanding of networks has been amassed on  
how networks work (Agranoff ,2003; Brown & Keast, 2003;, Huxham & Vangen,  
1996, 2005; Kamensky & Burlin, 2004; Keast, Brown &Mandell, 2007; Keast et al.,  
2004; Kickert; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Mandell, 2001a, 2008a; O’Leary, 2006;  
Provan & Milward, 1995, 2001; Vandeventer & Mandell, 2007). These studies have  
all contributed to unpacking the previous ‘black box’ of network structure and  
functioning. Missing from this conceptualisation thus far has been an understanding  
of the relationship between drivers for network formation, the type of network  
formed, and the impact of the participants’ perceptions, attitudes, and values on the  
operational dynamics (implementation) and outcomes achieved.  
 
The question raised in this paper in relation to the 3Is is whether the way a network is  
established and operationalised based on the 3 different perspectives makes a  
difference in their effectiveness. In other words, do the differences really matter? Or  
can other factors such as implementation, also influence the functioning of a network  
and its outcomes?  
 
Early network literature explained the rise of network forms primarily on an inter- 
organisational perspective based predominantly around the desire to secure a stable  
flow of resources (Alter & Hage, 1993; Bardach, 1999; Benson, 1975; Goes & Park,  
1997). More recent network literatures and theoretical perspectives reflect a more  
nuanced conceptualisation for the adoption and formation of network approaches.  
These include the search for legitimacy, complex problem solving and innovation,  
social inclusion and democracy (Powell, Kaput & Smith-Doer, 1996; Huxham, 2000;  
Mandell, 2008b, 2001b; Mandell & Keast, 2008). In this paper we have categorised  
this set of motivations leading to different types of networks under the headings –  
instrumental, institutional and interpersonal initially put forward by Kickert et al.  
(1997) to describe government approaches to network management. In setting forth  
this framework Kickert et al (1997) acknowledged the incomplete nature of their  
conceptualisations and highlighted the need for greater attention to the  
implementation and functioning of networks to ensure a more integrated perspective.  
 
This paper therefore departs from the original application of the 3Is in that it extends  
its examination of network drivers beyond the government perspective and includes in  
 
 
 
its focus other organisations as initiators or sponsors of networks. Further, it uses  
these three perspectives to examine how they might explain the drivers or underlying  
motivations for networked involvement and implementation processes that may affect  
their performance and outcomes. In the next section we give an overview of the 3Is  
and the implementation of them. This section also draws together and synthesises the  
growing array of literature that has clustered around and extended beyond the initial  
conceptualisations of Kickert et al (1997). This is followed by an analysis of six case  
studies that are used to answer the question concerning the impact of the 3Is on the  
operational dynamics and effectiveness of networks.  
 
The 3Is  
 
The instrumental approach - From this perspective networks are tools to be used and  
applied directly, not only by state institutions and actors, but also by community and  
other groups that have power and influence (deBruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 1997). In this  
context the network is used to secure the achievement of the preset goals of  
governmental (or other authoritative entities), especially in terms of making possible  
goals that might not otherwise be achievable. That is, the network is used to push  
through changes from the initiating entity; thus supporting the steering function of  
government or other authoritative entities. Moreover, in doing so, the instrumentally  
oriented network can draw on the power of authority to meet these goals. Not  
surprisingly, governments with their special roles and powers, have a strong  
predilection towards the instrumental approach. From this perspective, typically  
governments (and to a lesser extent other authoritative entities such as foundations)  
engage in networks only as long as they remain in control. Unless they are consistent  
with the goals of the state or foundation, the values and goals of non-state actors in  
instrumental networks are not considered to be significant and therefore can become  
secondary to the overall purpose.  
 
Given its strong connection to the vertical axis of authority the instrumental approach  
often looks to draw upon formalised mechanisms to direct and regulate action. These  
processes can include the mandate of the leader, as well as the application of  
structured agenda, planning processes and reporting regimes. However, according to  
De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof (1997) these classical vertical control devices do not  
always apply to networks because they lack the necessary degree of flexibility and  
variety and are generally focused on directed rather than collective outcomes. In their  
place, De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof (1997) suggest that more ‘refined’ influencing  
instruments are recommended, such as incentives and different types of  
communication mechanisms.  
 
By contrast to the instrumental approach and its emphasis on pre-set or centralised  
goals, the interpersonal and institutional perspectives focus on the development of a  
context for collective action. That is, unlike the instrumental perspective, it is  
recognised that no single actor/sector can drive a network reform process. Rather, the  
emphasis is on establishing an environment that enables participants to work together.  
 
The interpersonal approach stresses the interactions between a range of actors as they  
work together to generate innovative responses and new and better service models  
(Mandell & Harrington, 1999; O’Toole et al., 1997; Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997). In  
this bottom-up approach, the focus is not about attaining or delivering pre-set external  
 
 
 
goals but about contributing to and providing conditions for the process of finding a  
common purpose among a diverse set of interests. Within these interactions members  
draw on a suite of processes such as facilitating, mediating, and various training  
techniques to mould previously disparate positions into collective action. Through this  
process dense relations are built with an emphasis on collegiality re-enforced by a  
shared commitment to work together. It is not a case of the controller or the  
controlled, rather a collection of actors who exercise mutual influence. Strategies and  
goals can change as interaction between the actors creates and draws out common  
interests, clarifies points of interest and negotiates joint action. In this context new  
types of leaders, described as process catalysts (Mandell & Keast, 2009) emerge to  
play a central role in shaping the relations, mediating and negotiating outcomes, and  
helping to identify new solutions. In interpersonally orientated networks the primary  
focus is on the process of building new relationships rather than on achieving tasks.  
 
For the institutional approach the emphasis shifts from the formation of interpersonal  
relations and interactions between actors to the establishment of embedded routines  
and processes that guide joint action toward specific goals (Schaap & vanTwist,  
1997). Under the institutional approach there is less interest in the actual relations  
between actors or meeting specific goals. The objective is to develop the right  
structures and sets of rules to facilitate interaction rather than engage in the interaction  
itself (Kickert et al, 1997: 183-185). Instead, the focus is on establishing the rules of  
interaction as well as organisational frameworks that set the stage for ongoing  
interactions and strategy development. Through the establishment of embedded norms  
and routines practices emerge, which become institutionalised as ‘the way things are  
done” (Scott, 2001: 57). Adopting the dominant framework of network interaction  
and practice helps to legitimise participating organisations and enables them greater  
access to resources to assist their own organisational performance (Lowndes, 1996).  
 
From the above, it can be seen that the interactive/interpersonal and institutional  
approaches emphasise processes over instrumental power. The interpersonal and  
institutional approaches also emphasise the importance of mutual adjustment of  
actors’ perceptions rather than a directive to comply. Another basic difference  
between these two perspectives is in the degree to which the participants establish  
their own rules of behaviour. In the institutional perspective, the agency or  
organisation that establishes the network is involved in developing how the network  
can operate. Although not in the controlling mode of the instrumental approach, the  
initiating agency or organisation still wants to make sure that the network operates  
within certain parameters, following prescribed processes. In the  
interactive/interpersonal perspective, the participants have relatively free reign to  
design the way the network will operate to achieve its goals. Since new ways of  
behaving are the main goal the participants are given wide latitude in how they deal  
with each other. Although they will still be aware of some constraints, the emphasis  
will not be on shaping the strategies and rules of interaction, but rather on finding new  
ways of working with each other.  
 
This initial review of the literature demonstrates that each of the 3Is is different and  
has merit and application in certain contexts. Moreover, that they are underpinned and  
guided by different sets of operating assumptions and practices. Together the 3Is  
provide a basic framework to assist network architects and those charged with the  
responsibility for designing, managing and overseeing network activities. While these  
 
 
 
idealised forms and schema serve to distil the dominant or presenting characteristics  
they can overlook the nuances that can occur in network formation and operation,  
(implementation) which may lead to sub optimal outcomes.  
 
The Implementation Issues of Networks  
 
Before the 1970s the implementation issue was considered to be unproblematic as it  
was assumed that once a policy or program was developed it would be carried through  
to completion (Howett & Ramesh, 1995: 153). The apparent shortcomings of rural  
and urban development programs of the mid 1970s brought attention to the obstacles  
in carrying through the execution processes designed to deliver policies and services  
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). Initially focused on programmatic issues such as the  
clarity of goals and the level of resourcing dedicated to projects, the literature shifted  
to draw attention to the impact of time, the nature of policies and the level at which  
execution was to occur (Gogglin et al, 1990; Ryan, 1996; Blair, 2002). Within the  
later context, implementation was variously conceived as having either a top-down or  
bottom-up orientation (Ryan, 1996). The differential focus and driving forces of these  
layered approaches to implementation were considered to have practical  
consequences on the outcomes of initiatives. To expand, top-down approaches have  
focused on authority as the driver for implementation results, while bottom-up models  
have concentrated on the actors and institutions that plan, develop and carry out  
polices into services. Various attempts have been made to unify top-down and  
bottom-up implementation perspectives (e.g. Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979;  
Hasenfeld & Brock, 1991). However, as Ryan (1996) points out it may be that  
context, rather than level plays an important role in the type of outcomes forthcoming.  
 
Ongoing focus on implementation coupled with the efforts at unification of  
approaches brought the human dimension aspect of implementation in to greater  
consideration. That is, the impacts of social relations that can either enable or  
constrain change efforts (Blair, 2002). In this way it is argued that project actors,  
including network members have a level of ‘agency’ or control over the actual  
execution of the intent and the structures that are formed to facilitate outcomes. Along  
a similar line, Porter (1990) identified that the implementation structures (or the  
multi-institutional networks that formed to carry out an initiative) were separate or  
different to the design networks and therefore were open to ‘program drift’. As Porter  
(1990: 25) states: “the structural pose approach brings the individual back into the  
centre of implementation and action”.  
 
Increasingly policy and services are being implemented through various networked  
arrangements which are formed by often diverse sets of organisations, with  
differential power relations. Despite the important role of networks in the  
achievement of social change, to date there has been limited attention directed to  
understanding the impact of implementation process on network operation. In  
particular, there has been limited attention directed to the overall frameworks or  
systems for network implementation (Blair, 2002) or the inter-relationship between  
implementation layers and their drivers.  
 
 
 
Methodology  
 
This meta study draws on six case studies to explore the relationships between  
network formation, operational dynamics (implementation) and performance. These  
cases are based on research undertaken in both Australia and the United States and  
include: Chief Executive Officers Forum (CEO) (Keast et al., 2006), Service  
Integration Project (SIP) (Woolcock & Boorman, 2003; Keast et al., 2004); Family  
Youth Connections Network (Keast & Brown, 2006), The Water Forum (WF)  
(Connick, 2006), New Futures (NF) (Annie E. Casey Foundation, undated; Mandell,  
1994, 2001b; The Center for The Study of Social Policy, undated); and Life Services  
Systems (LSS) (Mandell, 1994).  
 
Case Selection and Building  
 
To understand the motivations for network formation (and its relationship to network  
processes) a cross- national and jurisdictional approach was undertaken. The network  
cases were drawn from multiple levels of government and community operation and  
from the international arenas of Australia and the United States. This purposeful  
sample of essentially homogeneous network cases (Patton, 1987) was coupled with a  
modified version of the most similar/most different case approach (Przeworski &  
Teune (1970) based on different levels of operation – strategic policy, administration  
and practitioner. Selecting cases located at different operational levels enabled the  
subtleties in terms of formation, operation and outcomes to be explored and  
exemplified. Table 1 provides a summary of the six network cases.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken to build the six network cases. Interview  
respondents included network members as well as identified key informants within  
the service system. The use of a semi-structured interview approach allowed  
respondents to describe their understandings and experiences of the network; in  
particular the basis for the adoption of a network approach and its implementation, in  
their own words (Denzin, 1984). In addition, in the Australian cases, focus groups  
were used to gain additional information from participants on their experience in  
shaping and operating within networks. In all cases, a review of relevant written  
documentation, such as project reports and internal correspondence, was used to  
supplement the interview information.  
 
Table 1 should go here  
 
Case Study Findings  
 
Both the WF and SIP cases were set up by government agencies based on the need to  
overcome a major crisis. In the case of SIP the network was formed in response to the  
violent death of an elderly citizen. The state government supported community  
demands that the agencies responsible for addressing the social and economic  
problems culminating in the incident should do something different in order to  
prevent this from happening again. In particular, there were calls for the agencies to  
move outside of their siloed service models to form a collaborative networked  
response (Keast, 2003, Keast et al., 2004; Woolcock & Boorman, 2003).  
 
 
 
In the case of the WF the network was formed in order to negotiate an agreement on  
how to better manage the water supply in the northern California region and also to  
preserve the habitat. Prior to the formation of the network all parties (government  
agencies, private developers, environmentalists, farmers and community groups) were  
constantly fighting with each other in court as to how scarce water resources should  
be allocated in the region.  
 
In both situations, the instrumental perspective appeared to present as the primary  
driver for the formation of a networked approach. However, this was not the  
situation. In both instances the government agencies involved realised from the outset  
that a traditional, authoritative approach would not work. That is, it was quickly  
apparent that the various governments could not mandate integration in either project  
case. Further, there was awareness that other processes were required to facilitate the  
formation of a network approach. As a SIP respondent noted: “It was recognised that  
we had to change the way we were working …. We had to develop stronger, more  
collegiate relations” (SIP Interview). For SIP and the WF instead of a top down  
imperative for change, new mechanisms were instituted by the projects to enable  
participants to work together in new ways and build stronger relations (an  
interpersonal perspective). In the case of the WF interest based negotiation  
(Connick, 2006; Innes & Booher, 1999, 2000; O’Leary & Bingham, 2007; Stepp et  
al., 1998) was used as the mechanism to establish improved relations and build a  
sense of common purpose. For SIP, the catalyst to building stronger relationships,  
collegiality and mutual commitment was a Graduate Certificate in Inter-Professional  
Development in which members established a common language and vision (Keast et  
al., 2004). In this way, across both networks there was a strong reliance on building  
better relations as a basis to collaboration and change, which occurred in both cases.  
 
In both LSS and FYCN the networks were formed based on the desire for better  
coordination of the work of government agencies. With LSS the driving force was to  
insure that mentally disabled adults would not get “lost” in the social services system.  
This project was established based on a grant from the Michigan State Development  
Disabilities Program. The agency forming the network perceived their role as  
directing all participants to coordinate their efforts to realize this goal. In this regard,  
the institutional perspective to network formation has application. All agencies were  
able to follow their existing case management rules and regulations but had to work in  
a coordinated effort in their program. In order to remain in the program each agency  
had to agree to work with a case management framework set up by the lead agency.  
To the extent that the participants were able to better coordinate their efforts and work  
together more efficiently they were considered effective.  
 
The FYCN was formed in response to a federal government policy stance requiring  
that previously independent services work together to develop a seamless approach to  
the youth homelessness service system. Under this initiative funding was directed  
only to those agencies demonstrating a networked approach to service delivery. Thus  
a concerted government policy direction and funding regime for integrated and  
especially networked service systems provided a strong institutional encouragement  
for agencies to participate. That is, to be legitimate recipients of funding, the  
organisations were required to band together into a collective unit displaying the  
required characteristics of collaboration. One agency took a lead role in establishing  
the network and developed a set of mechanisms to guide the interactions between the  
 
 
 
participating agencies. These processes included preparatory workshops to set the  
conditions for ‘working together’ and other more ‘institutionalised’ linking  
mechanisms such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), joint case  
management arrangements and brokerage funding.  
 
In the FYCN, while the primary impetus for a networked form was generated by  
government policy and funding, the idea of a set of agencies working together rather  
than in silos as was the case also had strong resonance for the members of this  
network (Keast & Brown, 2006). For many agencies the previously competitive  
practices were seen as detrimental to the overall quality of services for young people.  
A coming together of ‘like agencies’ was seen as a positive and progressive concept.  
Taking this agenda further, some participating agencies stressed that ‘far from being  
pushed into a network form by government funding’, they were motivated to do this  
‘because it was the right thing for our clients and our agencies” (Keast, 2003).  
 
Through their structured relations the FYCN members developed stronger  
interpersonal relations that provided additional support for the work that they were  
doing and enabled them to branch out from the ordered linkage arrangements to create  
new processes and outcomes. As a result of a growing commitment to working  
together, coupled with the embedded routines and practices, the FYCN contributed  
strongly to the local service system. In particular they developed a co-location model  
of service delivery, which aided joint case management and led to a number of  
effective cross agency projects (Ryan, 2004; Keast & Brown, 2006).  
 
Such service success was not the case with LSS however. This network body  
remained in its competitive mode and used the grant to coordinate its efforts and work  
more efficiently together as its only requirement. The participants used the network  
format to solidify existing arrangements and to strengthen their existing case  
management strategies. The difficulty was that this was only the tip of the iceberg.  
As long as the participants did not see the need to change their behaviour and the way  
their organisations operated, the effectiveness of this program was limited. What was  
needed was a move to change the existing rules and regulations and to work in new  
ways as a new whole. However, they never worked on changing their relationships or  
learning new ways of behaving with each other.  
 
In New Futures (NF) the aim was “to encourage a fundamental restructuring of the  
way [the communities in the program] planned, financed, and delivered educational,  
health, and other services to at risk-youth” (The Annie E. Casey Foundation, undated,  
p.v). The program was funded and directed by the Annie E. Casey Foundation.  
Because the emphasis of the program was on preventing truancy, funding went to the  
School Superintendent who assumed that the money should only go to improving  
programs for the schools, that is, doing the same work more efficiently. As long as  
new programs for the schools were approved, the program appeared to achieve  
success  
 
The motivations of achieving more programs for the schools (an instrumental  
perspective) became the dominant driver for the network due to the role of the school  
system as lead agency established by the grant. The difficulty was that the grant was  
meant to provide a means to develop new ways of serving youth across all agencies  
(governmental, private and non-profit) in the community. In order to do this, it was  
 
 
 
necessary to try to change all existing systems (including the schools) and to develop  
a new whole. Such a task is largely dependent on the skills and processes facilitated  
by an interactive/interpersonal approach to network formation. This was never fully  
developed.  
 
The rationale for the formation of the CEO was on establishing a whole-of- 
government approach to human services under the imprimatur of the state Premier  
(Menzies, 2002). A significant strategy for achieving this ‘cross-cutting’ goal centred  
on tapping into the CEOs’ personal relationships to engender a deeper understanding  
of each other and their work (O’Farrell, 2002). The formation of stronger  
interpersonal networks between the heads of departments was perceived essentially as  
a tool that the government could use to bring together a diverse set of resources.  
Although there was rhetoric of collaboration, in effect this network was focused on  
coordination through better alignment of resources and working more efficiently,  
rather than changing the system of service delivery (an instrumental perspective).  
 
However, on their own initiative informal relations between the leaders of the  
departments proved to be insufficient mechanisms to achieve a coherent package of  
policy and service initiatives. In response, a more formalised, vertical top-down  
approach that drew on structured meetings, set programs of work and planned  
agendas was instituted to supplement the informal relationships. Extending this  
vertical focus the network also became subject to ‘management and oversight’ by a  
Secretariat reporting directly to the Premier of the state. To drive the agenda for cross- 
department working, salary incentives were introduced for CEOs. However, alongside  
this vertical relational emphasis, the CEOs continued to interact and through  
initiatives such as the Community Cabinet Meetings were able to gain deeper personal  
insights and build commitment to each other. Through this interpersonal approach  
they were able to push past some of the previous turf based impediments to integrated  
policy and service delivery and create small windows of collective outcomes (CEO  
Interviews; Keast & Brown, 2006).  
 
The case reviews of each network reveal that although there was a primary or  
dominant driver to the formation of a network, it was generally supplemented by  
additional motivations that had an effect on the implementation, operational dynamics  
and outcomes achieved. Indeed, in some cases without the inclusion of a secondary  
driver, in particular the interpersonal perspective, the networks would have struggled  
(and in the case of NF, did struggle) to attain their objectives. This suggests that  
attention should be paid to the interpersonal aspect of network design and  
development as it seems to act as an anchor for the other mechanisms.  
 
Specifically, the case studies highlighted the role that network actors play in shaping  
the actual operation and functioning of networks. In several of the cases it was  
apparent that although there was a specified direction for outcomes, the network  
members were able to influence the way in which the network operated to achieve  
mutual rather than state centric goals. The CEO network provides a good example of  
this  
 
Together these findings lend support to the paper’s proposition that motivation for the  
formation of networks does have an effect on the implementation and operational  
dynamics. However, it also demonstrates that networks are frequently more complex  
 
 
 
and nuanced in their establishment and operation than expected and this points to a  
number of implications.  
 
Implications  
 
Although the above has demonstrated that there are a number of common motivators  
driving network formation, there are also some clear differences between groups. The  
most significant difference discerned within this set of cases is how the participants  
perceived and acted upon the restrictions placed on the network based on the  
dominant motivator/driver.  
 
For the WF and SIP although both cases were initiated by formal bodies, the need for  
more innovative solutions than the ones that had been tried was recognised at the  
outset. Therefore in effect, the formation of both these networks relied primarily on  
an interpersonal perspective. That is, the members were motivated by more than being  
told what to do; they were acting on a commitment to each other as ‘people and  
service providers’ and the realisation of the need for systems change. For the SIP  
participants this situation was encapsulated by the following statement: “... we were  
doing this because it was the right thing to do” (SIP Focus Group). Over time some  
of these interpersonal processes became embedded or institutionalised into the  
operating ethos of the network and accepted as ‘the way we do work’ (SIP Interview).  
For the WF participants, it was the role of the outside facilitator who kept them  
focused on learning about each other and developing new ways of behaving.  
 
In both cases, the instrumental perspective did not disappear. With SIP the  
instrumental shadow was apparent in both the strong attention directed to it by senior  
government representatives and the demands for ‘hard evidence’ of its cost/benefit  
impact. In the WF case, the participants had to report back each step of their progress  
to their individual agencies and/or organisations to secure their approval to proceed.  
This was to insure that the individual organisations’ goals and interests were kept in  
the foreground. Nevertheless, for both projects the primary focus was not on  
achieving tasks, per se, but rather finding new ways of dealing with each other. Once  
this was accomplished, the participants were able to focus on how to accomplish tasks  
in new ways.  
 
In the case of the CEO network and NF both were based on the mandate of the  
initiating organisation to effect change. For the CEOs it was the oversight of the  
Secretariat reporting directly to the Premier. In the case of NF it was the authority  
given to the school superintendent by the Annie E. Casey Foundation. In both cases,  
these mandates, requiring network formation, was a critical motivation for their  
involvement and engaged action within the network.  
 
In the case of NF the school superintendent used the authority given to him by the  
grant from the Annie E. Casey Foundation to act as if he was the “director” of the  
network. He acted as if he was in a top-down position of control. Although some of  
the other participants tried to work in a more horizontal fashion, this was not enough  
to compensate for the superintendent’s perception that he was “in charge” of the  
network. This, of course, was reinforced by the way the Foundation set up the grant.  
Instead of allowing for the freedom needed to build new relationships and develop  
new ways of working, the grant instead served to put the school superintendent in a  
 
 
 
position of authority. In the end, this is what led to its eventually being disbanded and  
limiting the extent of its effectiveness. As Whetten (1977) pointed out, some  
networks, especially those prompted by legislation, are more vertical than others.  
Members in such a network may be forced to accept the authority of the ‘driver  
sponsor’ and the position of that person/or agency may influence the direction of the  
work.  
 
In the case of the CEO network, however, although the dominant perspective led to an  
emphasis on a more structured approach to coordinating services, the perceptions of  
the participants of their need to also build better relationships led to the establishment  
of a collective social capital. This led to a form of network integrated by a deliberate  
mix of vertical authority and horizontal interpersonal relations and managed using  
structured processes. This allowed the participants to develop secondary strategies  
emphasizing working together horizontally as well as meeting the primary strategies  
of following the rules and mandates of the Secretariat. The augmentation and mix of  
approaches enabled the network to expand what could be done and thus to increase  
their effectiveness in developing new strategies.  
 
Coupling the more formalised and mandated processes of the hierarchy with the  
informal relations provided the additional leverage necessary for the group to begin to  
achieve the changes sought. In this way the CEOs’ network initially sought to use the  
informal interpersonal relations between members as a ‘soft’ mechanism with which  
to better link the sectors. When this proved insufficient a more tried and trusted ‘hard’  
instrumental approach was adopted, which included management strategies that  
created conditions under which goal-oriented processes can take place (De Brujin and  
Ten Heuvelhof, 1997). This allowed for the mix of first generation instruments such  
as rules and the power of mandate with second generation strategies such as pay  
incentives for CEOs demonstrating horizontal working. Together the instrumental  
and interpersonal network drivers created an environment that was largely effective in  
that through its efforts there had ‘begun to be some tentative inroads to cross-agency  
integration (O’Farrell, 2000; Keast, 2003).  
 
For both FYCN and LSS, an authoritative government body stipulated a particular  
framework that was to be adopted by the network. In both cases the emphasis was on  
the need to better coordinate their services. For LSS, the state saw the need to  
coordinate services for the mentally disabled adults, but did not want to give up  
control of how this was to be done. The focus was only on how best to carry out  
existing services among the many agencies and organisations involved in this process.  
The participants were limited to the way they could implement the coordinated  
services and relied on the existing case management system to do this. The  
participants were comfortable with these limitations as they saw themselves as  
competitors and therefore they were not willing to change any of their existing ways  
of operating. To the extent that the participants were able to better coordinate their  
services, this program can be seen to have been effective. But as one participant  
pointed out, the heads of the agencies involved were never able to take the really  
critical step of changing their competitive mode and working together in new and  
better ways to deliver their services for fear of losing their authority and/or resources.  
In essence, the institutional perspective allowed the participants to maintain the status  
quo.  
 
 
 
In the FYCN although this network was also formed based on the institutional  
perspective, the participants saw the existing competitive mode as unproductive and  
used the network as a chance to change their relationships. Initially the members  
were oriented toward the formation of a collaborative network model. However, it  
was quickly realised that ‘this would not work as we had no common goal, purpose  
and no real trust” (FYCN, Interview 20 February). It was recognised that with a  
limited history of working together, few existing relationships between agencies and  
limited trust, it was necessary to spend time learning about each other’s organisation  
and trying to build rapport. This relationship building process took place and was  
facilitated around a regular schedule of meetings as well as a succession of workshops  
designed to develop joint initiatives. Relationship building and trust were further  
enhanced through closer casework management. Through these institutionalised  
linkage mechanism and the interpersonal capacity building undertaken the FYCN has  
been able to shift its operation and in doing so it has contributed significantly to the  
quality of service delivery in its service precinct (Keast & Brown, 2006; Ryan, 2004).  
 
The implications of these findings are that as a first point it is necessary to have a  
clear and complete understanding of the network, including its set of  
drivers/motivators in order to be able to adjust, reconfigure and supplement the  
components to achieve outcomes. Monitoring of this mix should be a regular or  
ongoing process as it is likely to be shifted over time in response to emergent  
conditions and contexts.  
 
Second, as the findings revealed, the form of network operation predicted by the  
driving motivation can often be disrupted or changed by the network actors. That is,  
regardless of the network type or drivers, network actors can over-run the original  
intent and re-establish new goals to better meet agreed purposes. As the findings  
demonstrated interpersonal networks appeared to provide a stronger connection to  
network outcomes. However, these were most effective when combined with  
institutional frameworks to anchor the interpersonal or relational processes, and in  
doing so, engender an element of sustainability to networks. In this way, it could be  
argued the coming together of two or more of the ‘Is’ positively impacts on the  
operational dynamics of the network and its implementation process. This finding  
lends support to the integrative implementation perspective (Blair, 2002) and suggests  
a stronger role for meso level implementation processes (i.e. between top-down and  
bottom-up) which are embedded at the institutional level.  
 
Finally, the dominant perspective in a network is based on the motivation for  
establishing the network in the first place, and may continue or change over time. An  
interesting discovery for this set of network cases is that where the government or the  
funding agency appeared to have greater control of the operating environment there  
was a preference to use the interactive/interpersonal and institutional approaches. By  
contrast, where government or the funding agency lacked confidence in its ability to  
influence, or where the issue is so significant that change must be achieved, there was  
a greater propensity to adopt an instrumental approach that manipulates networks to  
achieve preset government goals. This result has resonance with Atkinson and  
Coleman’s (1989) strong-state and weak-state conceptualisation, where strong-state  
models are more prepared to cede some power to network actors while weaker-states  
have a need to retain a level of control over outcomes. This duality of approach has  
 
 
 
also been described elsewhere (Keast, 2004) as the ‘hands-on and hands-off’ model of  
network functioning.  
 
The various network formation drivers and mechanisms for each of the network cases  
are summarised in Table 2 along with the outcomes. Drawing these elements together  
provides a beginning conceptual framework for those charged with the responsibility  
for forming and managing networks.  
 
 
Put Table 2 here 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
New pressures on policy making and service delivery have resulted in the uptake of a  
variety of networked forms to achieve previously out of range goals or to address  
complex social problems in new and innovative ways. Three key drivers for the  
formation of networks have been identified: instrumental, institutional and  
interpersonal. Each of these reflects some fundamental choices in the form of  
networks developed and the expected outcomes. There are a number of different  
reasons for selecting one approach over another. The approach taken can depend on  
the degree of the crisis that prompts a network to be established. It can also depend  
on the amount of risk the participants are willing to take. Finally it may be governed  
by political expediency, in other words, what is the quickest and most acceptable way  
to solve the problem(s).  
 
The 3I’s provide a model for understanding the drivers and dynamics of the processes  
that occur within different types of networks. Although the 3Is were presented as  
ideal types, with each informed by a particular set of assumptions and functioning  
styles, the findings have distilled a much more nuanced rationale and approach to the  
formation and implementation of networks. In all cases there was evidence of more  
than one motivating force in play; with the interpersonal/interactional element acting  
to both anchor and shape network activities. The case studies therefore also revealed  
the role that network actors can take in shifting the implementation and operation  
dynamics of networks. Distilling these components also contributes to a better  
management of the network processes.  
 
Classifying and responding to the networks based on their dominant characteristic can  
be useful to develop a base response. However to be able to fully understand, design  
and operate the network it is necessary to have a more complete picture of the suite of  
motivators, their overlaps and the impact of operational dynamics such as  
implementation. Based on this knowledge, those entities that establish networks can  
have some strategies in place to accommodate these nuances and in the end may be  
able to reach their goal of developing more effective networks.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Summary Details of Study Cases  
Cases  Service  Operating Level  
orientation/goal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Composition  
Chief  
Executive  
Officers  
Human  
Services  
Network  
Service  
Integration  
Project  
Youth  
Connections  
Network  
The Water  
Forum  
 
 
New Futures  
Program  
 
 
Life Services  
System  
Strategic Integrated  
Policy and Service  
 
 
 
 
Community  
governance  
 
Seamless Service  
Provision  
 
Innovative  
solutions to existing  
policies  
 
Integrated policies  
& services  
 
 
Seamless service  
provision  
Strategic policy level  
 
 
 
 
 
Administrative/regional  
 
 
Practitioner/base level  
 
 
Strategic level  
 
 
 
Strategic level  
 
 
 
Administration  
Practitioner level  
Chief Executive Officers of State  
government Human Services  
Departments  
 
 
 
Regional Managers of government and  
community agencies  
 
Community Service Practitioners  
 
 
Heads of State Agencies; CEOs of  
private companies; City Managers;  
Heads of non-profit & community  
groups  
City Manager; Heads of public  
agencies; CEOs of private companies;  
Heads of non-profit ^ community  
groups  
Department heads; Service  
practitioners  
 
 
 
 
 
Table2: Summary Comparison of Network Cases  
 
Network  Formation  Linkage  
Drivers  mechanisms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcomes  
CEO  
 
Whole-of  
government  
coordination  
 
 
 
SIP  
 
Systems  
Change:  
Community  
Governance  
 
 
 
 
 
FYCN  
Seamless  
service  
approach  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WF  
Develop  
innovative  
solutions  
 
 
 
 
NF  
Build new  
systems for  
youth  
 
LSS  
Better  
coordination  
of services  
 
Instrumental  
 More efficient use  
of resources  
 
Interpersonal  
 Based on existing  
working relations  
Instrumental  
 Integrated service  
system  
 
Interpersonal  
 Commitment to  
collaborative  
working  
 
 
 
Institutional  
 
 Pressure to  
conform to  
funding  
Interpersonal  
 Agreement to work  
together  
 
 
 
Interpersonal  
 Extending &  
enhancing relations  
 
Instrumental  
 Reporting back to  
parent  
organizations  
Instrumental  
 Better  
collaboration to  
find new solutions  
 
Institutional  
 Maintaining  
turf/resources  
Imprimaturs of Premier  
Official Mandate  
Tight agendas & action plans  
DPC (gov) Secretariat  
Pay Incentive  
 
Community Cabinet Meetings  
 
 Tight Agendas  
Government focus on results  
 
Certification in Inter-professional  
Development  
Relationship checking in meetings  
Regular communication sessions (face  
to face)  
Relationship building activities  
 
 
MOU  
Brokerage & contracts  
Case management  
 
Regular workshops  
Relationship building activities  
 
 
 
 
 
Developing new  
relationships/behaviours  
Outside consultant training using  
interest-based negotiations  
Strong dense relationships  
 
 
 
Foundation grant authority  
Informal meetings among some of the  
participants (limited)  
 
 
Case management  
Use of existing agencies’ rules and  
regulations  
Enhanced  
executive decision  
making  
Joint policy  
initiatives – Crime  
Prevention  
Joint projects  
initiatives  
Tailored community  
specific program  
Community social  
infrastructure enhanced  
Whole of community  
approach  
operationalised  
Stability of service  
delivery systems  
Shared resources &  
pooled funds  
Co-location of services  
& shared administration  
Seamless service  
delivery - joint case  
management model  
operational  
Joint projects &  
services  
 
 
 
MOU committing all  
parties to new  
arrangements for next  
30 years  
 
 
 
 
Limited coordination  
initially  
Eventually disbanded  
without achieving  
innovative solutions  
Better coordination  
among all government  
agencies  
No changes in existing  
rules and regulations  
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